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BOOK REVIEWS
FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION. By Charles E. Rice. New York: New York
University Press, 1962. Pp. 202. $6.00. This book by Professor Rice of Fordham
University Law School is a further development of his dissertation for a J.S.D. at
New York University Law School.
Professor Rice discusses an interesting new notion in the law, "freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas ... ," first expressed
by Justice Harlan in NAACP v. Alabama.' "It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of speech."12 The aim of the book is to show how
the concept "freedom of association" is needed in the contemporary legal world,
and to locate its place in the "hierarchy of fundamental liberties."
After the introduction of the reader to its interesting topic, the book discusses
the Jurisprudential Background of freedom of association from Plato to Maritain,
and, in American Background, its constitutional historical development from prerevolutionary days to Tocqueville. Then follow the main chapters: Freedom of
Association and Religion, Freedom of Association and Livelihood, Freedom of
Association and Political Parties and Pressure Groups, and Freedom of Association
and Subversive Associations. The final chapter is Basic Principles of Freedom of
Association in the United States, drawn from the discussion in the preceding
chapters.
The text, footnotes, and bibliography indicate prodigious labor by Professor
Rice, who writes well about law. And the reader will find very interesting insights
into the First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms. He writes, for instance:
There are situations, however, in which an individual's right to do, or
not to do, a particular thing becomes greater or less when he acts in association with others. A person who conscientiously objects to military service
has a clearer
immunity to service if his objection is a tenet of a religious
group: * * * Conversely, a person's individual right to oppose the government decreases
when he does so in association with others (in) subversive
3
groups.
The four main chapters are devoted to showing that religious, political and
labor cases could have been decided by the Supreme Court with reference to freedom of association, instead of the traditional freedoms, with more satisfactory4
results in some of the cases. For example, he discusses Reynolds v. United States,
sustaining the convictions of Mormons for practicing polygamy, and implies the
facility with which the decision might have been reached by reference to freedom
of association: Mormons were not free to do as members of an association, what
each member as an individual could not do. And he thinks that Sunday closing
laws may be said to compel Jews to associate in the Sunday observance and prevent
them from exercising their freedom to associate with the members of their own
religious sect. Similar observations are made with respect to cases within the areas
of labor and politics. The reader may or may not be persuaded that freedom of
association is a more useful concept than those of the traditional freedoms for
dealing with the issues in these cases.
One need not be persuaded of that nor reflect long on what Professor Rice
says to see that in our swiftly changing world the town meeting connotations of
assembly and petition have little meaning in reference, for instance, to the Teamsters Union, or the National Association of Manufacturers. The idea of association
is a much clearer expression to describe these national far-flung groups, who meet
really only through delegates in convention and whose members may never assemble.
These considerations are implicit in what Justice Harlan wrote of NAACP, and
it is likely that the expression "freedom of association" will appear with increasing
1 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).

2 Ibid.

3 Text at xviii.
4 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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frequency in opinions and other legal literature, discussing issues involving competing interests of rights of members of national groups and authority of government
to limit exercise of the rights.
The four main chapters rest on an initial assumption that Justice Harlan discovered a separate, definitive and "essentially distinct" 5 constitutionally protected
freedom. They are devoted to identifying its principles and its prominent place in
the First Amendment freedoms.
I have trouble with the assumption.
It probably makes little difference whether we say freedom of association or
freedom of assembly, so long as we understand what we mean. It should make a
difference that when we use the one for the other we do not mean that it is
essentially different. And not only because one is a genus and the other a species.
But also because young lawmen and students should not look to the Constitution
alone for basic human rights, which are prior to the Constitution. Also we ought,
inthe interest of relative certainty in the law, not call a new definitive right each new
future expression of an old right. To do so will be to clutter up the law.
It doesn't seem to me that Justice Harlan, in the NAACP case, made an essential distinction between, or definitely separated, freedom of association and freedom
of assembly. He used the expressions interchangeably in referring to the rights of
members of the NAACP to associate for the purpose of discussing and furthering
its aims. In the NAACP case, in referring to the right of lobbying, Justice Harlan
also used the term "right to advocate" interchangeably with the right to petition.
This doesn't change the nature of the right to petition.
Justice Harlan could not logically have made an essential distinction between
freedom of association and freedom of assembly. When Warren and Brandeis at
the turn of the century wrote their famous essay on the right of privacy of one's
person, 6 logic was with them and they carved out of the general right of property
a right of a different nature: one's property is essentially different from one's
person. But a general essentially different freedom of association cannot logically
be carved out of the freedoms of assembly or petition. They are specific freedoms
of assembly or petition. They are specific freedoms of that general freedom. The
words of Justice Goldberg in Gibson v. Florida Leg. Inv. Comm.7 bear this out;
he spoke there of "First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights." So do
those of Justice Black in the same case, where he stated that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments "encompass freedom of the people to associate in an infinite number
of organizations including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People .... 9

Freedom of association is as broad as the basic need of human nature for
companionship. It is not only implied in, but is presupposed by, the Constitution
and by the First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms. It is as basic as freedom
to talk, and under it human beings have always joined with others to speak, worship,
work, advocate and subvert.
Experience teaches that freedom of association is not a separate definitive
freedom. We don't just associate to promulgate ideas or beliefs. We associate to
discuss or promulgate ideas about something: about worship, or work, or business, or
to voice grievance about government, and so on. Consequently, when we discuss freedom of association in the concrete, it is necessary to link the general freedom with
the particular purpose of the association. The assumption made at the beginning
of the book appears to overlook this. The book, however, seems to recognize it in
the titles it has given to the chapters: Freedom of Association and Religion, etc.
5 Description is used by Professor McKay of New York University Law School in the
Foreword. Text at ix.
6 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
7 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4311 (U.S. March 25, 1963).
8 Id. at 4313.
9 Id. at 4317.
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It seems Professor Rice has done what the Supreme Court judges have done.
He has written in a new way about an old freedom and right Each writing judge
uses his own style, doing a work of art by putting something of himself in his opinions.
So Justice Harlan in the NAACP case drew out "freedom of * * * assembly" to
cover NAACP and called the traditional freedom "the freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."' 1 And in the Gibson case Justice
Goldberg said: "rights of speech, press, association and petition,"" while Justice
Black in traditional mode wrote, "Freedoms of religion, speech, assembly and
petition."' 12 And in Gideon v. Wainwright,13 Justice Black changed pace and,
illustrating the fundamental nature of First Amendment freedoms, said: "speech,
press, religion, assembly, association,and petition for redress of grievances."'4 (Emphasis added.)
These several reasons prevent me from accepting the assumption which is
the basis for the book. It follows that I cannot say that the book shows freedom
of association's "position and durability in the hierarchy of fundamental liberties"' 5
as a definitive and separate or "essentially distinctive"' 0" freedom.
Professor Rice, in writing this book, has rendered a service toward future helpful
discussion of Freedom of Association. As Professor McKay says in the Foreword:
" * * * there will inevitably be disagreement over interpretation. The important
thing is that the relevant arguments have been made, clearly and calmly. Professor
Rice has made a real contribution to understanding in the area by indicating7
unmistakably the points on which discussion of the pertinent issues should center."'
Roger J. Kiley*
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY. By Cornelius J. Moynihan.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. 254. $4.50. Since 1946 I have been telling
my students that Professor Moynihan's Preliminary Survey of the Law of Real
Property, which was published in 1940, was the best short textbook on the subject,
and I have no reason to withhold similar approval of the basic revision which
has just been published under the title "Introduction to the Law of Real Property."
It is hardly necessary to mention the almost insuperable difficulties which are present
inany brief survey of an important field of law. Professor Million in his review of
Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property,' has referred to "the deceptive certainty
inherent in any summary," and there is no purpose in laboring a point of which
Professor Moynihan was certainly aware. His penetrating discussions of certain
phases of the law of real property, especially when he turns his attention to the
general topic of uses, 2 demonstrates his thorough knowledge of the wider reaches
of the law of real property at which a brief survey can only hint. With the warning,
perhaps unnecessary, that the beginning student will not become a master of the
law of real property by reading this book, it is my opinion that the author has come
as close as is possible to performing the almost impossible task of surveying this
branch of the law in preliminary fashion without doing more harm than good. I
am still somewhat torn between the desirability of providing the student with this
type of collateral reading, rather than referring him to spot references to a few

10

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
11 Gibson v. Florida Leg. Inv. Comm., 31 U.S.L.
1963).
12 Id. at 4317.
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4311, 4313 (U.S. March 25,

13 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4291 (U.S. March 18, 1963).
14 Id. at 4293.
15
16
17
*

1
2

Text at xix.
Id. atix.
Id. at x and xi.
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
U. oF PA. L. REv. 261

Text at 173-215.

(1962).
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of the topics dealt with in the classic treatises, such as the superb and definitive
treatise of Professor Powell. On the whole, I think that the balance lies in favor
of the short summary, which is still in more or less disrepute, but for which the
late Professor Llewellyn had a word of praise more than twenty-five years ago.
The present revision follows the form of the content of the earlier edition,
although certain topics, especially powers of termination, contingent remainders,
and the doctrine of worthier title, are more fully developed. The author follows
his discussion of each historical estate at common law with a description of its
modem equivalent; an excellent method for purposes of contrast, but breaking the
continuity of historical development which is perhaps more important to the
student.
Benjamin Franklin's diary reveals his practice, before reaching a decision, of
making a list of the arguments for and against a proposed course of conduct. I
have tried out this method in evaluating the book under review, and its virtues
far outweigh what I conceive to be its defects. I find numerous important topics
in which the treatment is excellent and contains in several instances important
contributions to the learning in this branch of law. There is an admirable discussion of the dual character of leaseholds as contracts and as interests in land.3 There
is a good simple explanation of subinfeudation, 4 and of the effect of the abolition
of subinfeudation as benefitting the overlord. A nicely compressed discussion of
the distinction between an assignment and a sublease appears,5 although no reference is made to the realistic argument that if the right of re-entry were held to
constitute a reversion, as it is in some states, assignments would be a virtual impossibility since such a right is retained in practically every case. There is a good discussion of the pre-1536 law of remainders.6 The distinction between vested and
contingent remainders is discussed.' The question of ownership of contingent
remainders in favor of a person not in existence is well treated.8 The author points
out that remainders which are contingent because they are limited to persons unborn
are really only the recognition by law of the possibility of a legal ownership between
a person and the property arising in the future.9 This possibility has present legal
consequences, for example in limiting the rights of the owner of the prior estate
to deal with the property as though no such potential interests had been created.
There is a clear statement of the purpose and function of the early use in the
discussion of the Statute of Uses; ° a mild criticism might be advanced that note 5,
page 176 fails to point out the device of permitting feoffees que use to appoint
substitute feoffees que use for those who have died, thus eliminating the necessity
for a re-enfeoffment. The discussion of the new methods of conveyancing resulting
from the Statute is clearer than any I recall elsewhere. 1 1 A good statement of
the distinction between remainders and executory interests appears, 2 to the effect that
an executory interest is a divesting interest; a remainder, a successive one. The
point is strongly made that the distinction between executory interests and contingent
remainders is the indestructibility of the executory interest.13 An excellent explanation of the rule of Purefoy v. Rogers is included ;14 a future interest which could
take effect as a contingent remainder must take effect as such, or fail. The entire
discussion of the Statute of Uses is admirable, as is the explanation of the origin
3
4
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Id. at 70.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113 et seq.
Id. at 113, 123.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 173-184.
Id. at 185 et seq.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
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of the modem trust, 5 usually left to passing reference. Excellent summaries of the
statutory law appear at several places, for example as to concurrent estates,16 and
the destructibility rule.' 7 More of such summaries would have been helpful to the
student and instructor as well.
Now for what appear to me to be inadequacies in what is on the whole an
admirable summary of the law of real property. I find the term "nonfreehold
estates" in the discussion of introductory matters,' s somewhat inconsistent; a more
generic distinction is the availability qua non of real writs for the protection of
possession of interests in land other than freehold interests. A more thorough documentation of the matters discussed in the first twenty-two pages of the book would
be desirable; some of the beginning students may aspire to become more thorough
students someday.
The discussion of the problem of "death without issue" illustrates the danger
of an overly brief treatment.' 9 This discussion really belongs under Future Interests
in chapter 5. In the discussion of the effect of married women's emancipation
statutes, 0 there is no mention of the peculiar Massachusetts rule, 2' although note 242
on page 54 sets forth the statute. The discussion of modem substitutes for dower
fails to mention the statutory rule in some jurisdictions which makes the distributive
share of each spouse a legal lien on real property during coverture. Is the doctrine
of constructive eviction really based on the doctrine of failure of consideration, 23 or
is it not based on a deeper equitable doctrine of relief from hardship which underlies both concepts and is expressed in the formula of an implied covenant of quiet
24
enjoyment? The doctrine is not applied to leases as widely as the author indicates.
No argument as to the merit or lack of merit of the doctrine of frustration, so important in leases, appears in the discussion of that topic in the text. There is no
reference, in the discussion of the problem of the obligation of the landlord to
mitigate damages when the tenant quits the premises, of the landlord's dilemma
in determining whether the tenant has or has not abandoned the premises. The
relation of the length of the holdover period and the Statute of Frauds is not discussed at all. 25 The validity of spendthrift provisions in trusts as affecting the
alienability of the equitable interest is ignored, and the important question of the
effect of the doctrine of worthier title on consents necessary in the case of statutorily revocable trusts is discussed only briefly.2 Happily, a circular statement
which appeared at page 59 of the first edition is left out.
How can there be a contingent remainder to an unborn person? The later
explanation 27 is inconsistent with the better explanation of the nature of such an
interest given earlier.2 It seems particularly unfortunate that the author has not
given the reader the benefit of his deep knowledge of the historical development
of the law of real property with regard to the Rule against Perpetuities, which is
intentionally omitted.2 9 References to treatments elsewhere would have been helpful
to the beginning student. The argument against the rule of Dumpor's Case is only
hinted at, and not developed, in the text.
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Id. at 210-212.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 1-22.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 53.
Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
Text at 57.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73. See cases cited in Corbin, Contracts § 1356, at n. 13 (1950).
Text at 82.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 104.
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Documentation has not progressed in a notable degree beyond the date of the
cases cited in the original, edition of 1940. In addition to sparse documentation
in the early introductory matters, it is uniformly scant and somewhat less than
adequate, in the opinion at least of this reviewer. No authority is cited concerning
the effect of restraints on alienation of life interests.30 Documentation on the
modem attitude toward Dumpor's Case is meager; only one case is cited contra,31
in New York, where the question has not been authoritatively settled. To the 1949
New York case cited might be added Northerly Corp. v. Hermett Realty Corporation.3 2 Documentation of the problem of the landlord's duty to mitigate damages
is particularly scanty," with no case cited since 1946. In the author's discussion
of seisin,3 4 he speaks of a "recent" English case which is said to recognize the
existence of a fee simple determinable, decided in 1944. In the discussion of transferability of a possibility of reverter,3 5 the author cites only New York law, and
the Restatement; a reference is also made to Powell, Real Property.
There are a few inconsistencies. The author states that a life estate has the
quality of alienability,3 6 but then he says that "a life estate is not as a practicable
matter a marketable commodity. ' 3' In the discussion of the fee tail, citation of
statutes in the four states38 said to recognize the fee tail would have been helpful.
Throughout the book, much time would be saved the reader if the text of typical
statutes had been set forth; a study which the student may never undertake.
I have been the target of a sufficient number of reviews to feel it necessary to
add that the foregoing criticisms are stated with the desire to suggest what to me
seems the possibility of still further improvement in a subsequent edition; and that
the validity of those of the foregoing criticisms with which the learned author may
agree does not detract from my estimate, stated at the beginning of this review,
that the book is excellent, scholarly and well worth while. It should relieve the
harassed instructor in the basic course in Real Property from sleepless nights in
which he berates himself for failure to cover in detail topics for which time is lacking,
as he would realize in his waking hours. It will give the conscientious student the
opportunity for a comprehensive survey of the continuing story of the law of real
property which he might otherwise never grasp.
Ralph A. Newman*"
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Id. at 59.
Id. at 75, n. 6.
15 App. Div. 2d 888, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (1962).
Text at 79, n. 6.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101, n. 2.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 41.
Professor of Law, The American University.
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